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NOTES AND COMMENTS
in the LoBue case seemed to be emphasizing this very point when it
referred to a "readily ascertainable market value." Rather than put a
highly conjectural valuation on the stock, the courts might prefer to
defer any taxable amount to the time the option is exercised. 42 In many
cases this rule might prevent the small corporation employee's use of
the lower tax rates as regards nonrestricted stock options.
CONCLUSION
Although Commissioner v. LoBue solved one problem of the Com-
missioner by eliminating proprietary stock options, it left him with
another when the Court passed up the opportunity to stifle its own
dictum in the Smith case. In the light of this new dictum in the LoBue
case and the Court's apparent approval of the McNamara decision, the
Commissioner may have to modify his position concerning the treat-
ment of the option as compensation. Although valuation problems
may prevent the treatment of the option as compensation by employees
of small corporations, there appears a good chance for such treatment
by employees of larger corporations.
DOUGLAS 0. TICE, JR.
Wills-Admission of Extrinsic Evidence to Explain Ambiguities in
Wills
In a recent case, Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Wolfe,' the testa-
trix left a will which read in part as follows: "To my sister, Camille
H. Wolfe, I leave my furniture, household effects and personal property
(emphasis added). The balance of my estate, I leave to the National
Red Cross Society of America." After payment of ascertained lia-
bilities and other bequests there remained $911.42 cash, and $20,915.78
in bonds and securities exclusive of furniture and household effects.
Both the Red Cross and Camille H. Wolfe claimed the cash, bonds,.
and securities under the will. The Red Cross contended that the words,
"personal property," in the bequest to Mrs. Wolfe was limited to
furniture, household effects, etc. and that they did not include stocks,
bonds, and cash which they claimed passed under the residuary clause
of the will. Mrs. Wolfe contended that the testatrix intended that the
stocks, bonds, and cash be included under the term, "personal property."
In trying to prove their contentions, both Mrs. Wolfe and the Red Cross
between return of capital and profit. The taxpayer argued that there was no ascer-
tainable present value of the profit. The Court decided in taxpayer's favor. There
would be no profit until taxpayer recovered her cost. See also Westover v.
Smith, 173 F. 2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949).
42 Burnet v. Logan, supra note 41.
1243 N. C. 469, 91 S. E. 2d 246 (1956).
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sought to introduce extrinsic evidence to aid in the construction of the
will, which evidence was refused by the lower court. On appeal, the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that
there was a patent ambiguity and that evidence of the surrounding cir-
cumstances at the time of the testator's death should be admitted.
Thus, it is often the case that an otherwise valid will presents difficult
problems of construction because of ambiguities in the language em-
ployed. The question then presents itself: Under what circumstances
is it possible to introduce extrinsic evidence to aid in the construction of
the will?
The justification for admission of extrinsic evidence is the necessity
of the sitaution; that is, an ambiguity in the will itself, and unless an
ambguity exists, the testator's intention must be found only within
the "four corners of the will."2
The courts have classified ambiguities into two categories, "latent"
and "patent." A patent ambiguity arises when the will is ambiguous
on its face; i.e., from the very reading of the words of the will it is not
clear what they mean or what the testator intended.3 Thus, a will which
read: "I give to my four daughters the plantations on which I now live.
If any of my daughters die without issue, their portion is to be equally
divided among the three survivors & co.," 4 was held by our court to be
a. patent ambiguity because from the reading of the will the meaning
of the phrase, "& co.," was not clear. Also, if a testator leaves one
tract of land to two different people in the same will,5 the ambiguity is
apparent on the face of the instrument and is therefore patent.
The admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain or resolve a patent
ambiguity, has long been the subject of conflict among the courts. The
broad rule laid down in such cases is that extrinsic evidence is not ad-
missible in the case of a patent ambiguity, because the document was
void upon its face due to the uncertainty, and no interpretation could
be given to the words as there was nothing to interpret." This rule is
much too broad, however, when one considers the number of cases
'Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Green, 239 N. C. 612, 80 S. E. 2d 771
(1954) ; R. J. Reynolds v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 201 N. C. 267, 159 S. E.
416 (1931); Kidder v. Bailey, 187 N. C. 505, 122 S. E. 22 (1924); Wooten v.
Hobbs, 170 N. C. 211, 86 S. E. 811 (1915) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1627 (3rd ed. 1941).
Taylor v. Maris, 90 N. C. 619 (1884); Institute v. Norwood, 45 N. C. 65
(1853); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941); 20 Am. JuR., Evidence § 1156
(1939).
'Taylor v. Maris, supra note 3.
'Bank of Manhatten v. Gray, 53 R. I. 377, 166 At]. 817 (1933) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS§ 1623 (3rd ed. 1941).
' Taylor v. Maris, 90 N. C. 619 (1884) ; Bailey v. Bailey, 52 N. C. 44 (1859);
Barnes v. Simms, 40 N. C. 392 (1848) ; Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. 26 (1845)
Field v. Eaton, 16 N. C. 483 (1829).
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which admit some extrinsic evidence where the ambiguity was patent.7
The North Carolina Court has become more liberal in its attitude
toward allowing extrinsic evidence to aid in the construction of a
will where there is a patent ambiguity provided such extrinsic evi-
dence is limited to what it calls "circumstances attendant."8  Our court
on numerous occasions has said that in the construction of a wil the
cardinal purpose is to ascertian and give effect to the intention of the
testator as expressed in the words he has used, and, that to ascertain
such intention, all the provisions may be examined in the light of the
surrounding circumstances. These circumstances include the state of
the testator's family at his death, the condition and nature of his prop-
erty, and the relationship of the testator to his family and to beneficiaries
named in the will.2 For instance, in Wooten v. Hobbs0 the court
said, "The writing in which the will must be expressed, contains the
only testamentary intention that the law will effectuate. This in-
tention must be found within the instrument or nowhere. Hence, ex-
trinsic evidence is inadmissible to show an intent not contained in the
document itself. But when the will is such as to call for construction,
the court, with a view to securing a proper construction, puts itself, so
far as may be, in the position of the testator, that it may see things
from his view point. To this end, evidence regarding all relevant facts
and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of executing the
will is admissible." In other words, the court, in the case of a patent
ambiguity, can hear evidence concerning the "circumstances attendant"
to the making of a will so as nearly as possible to place itself in the
position of the testator at the time he wrote the will in order to ascertain
his intent. This evidence is to be considered by the court without the
use of a jury.1 The court may, however, in its discretion, submit ques-
tions of fact to a jury for determination.' 2 It should be noted, however,
that the evidence admitted is limited to the circumstances surrounding
the making of the will, and declarations by the testator of his intention
whether made before or after the execution of the will are inadmissible
to show his intent.18
7 Hubbard v. Wiggins, 240 N. C. 197, 81 S. E. 2d 174 (1954) ; In re Will of
Johnson, 233 N. C. 570, 65 S. E. 2d 12 (1951); Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N. C.
611, 36 S. E. 2d 17 (1945); Heyer v. Bullock, 210 N. C. 321, 186 S. E. 356(1936); Scales v. Barringer, 192 N. C. 94, 133 S. E. 410 (1926); Snow v.
Boylston, 185 N. C. 321, 117 S. E. 14 (1923); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1624 (3rd ed.
1941) ; 57 Am. JuR., Wills § 1043 (1948).
8 Ibid. ' Ibid.10 170 N. C. 211, 86 S. E. 811 (1915).
"1 Cecil v. Cecil, 173 N. C. 410, 92 S. E. 158 (1917).
"In re Housing Authority, 235 N. C. 463, 70 S. E. 2d 500; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-172 (1953).
"' Holmes v. York, 203 N. C. 709, 166 S. E. 889 (1933) ; R. J. Reynolds v. Safe
Deposit and Trust Co., 201 N. C. 267, 159 S. E. 416 (1931) ; Raines v. Osborne,
184 N. C. 599, 114 S. E. 849 (1922).
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The true rule seems to be that if the ambiguity is patent and the in-
tention of the testator cannot be discovered by a consideration of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of execu-
tion, then the devise must fail since other evidence may not be introduced
to show the testator's intention.14
The other type of ambiguity, which is designated as latent, does not
appear on the face of the instrument, but becomes apparent when other
evidence is introduced. The instrument seems unambiguous but it be-
comes ambiguous when an attempt is made to apply the words to exist-
ing facts. 15 It is generally stated that parol evidence can be admitted
to explain a latent ambiguity. 16 If there is a latent ambiguity, the
declarations of the testator as to his intentions, in contrast to the case
of patent ambiguities, will be admitted to prove the testator's intention
whether the declaration was made before or after the will.17
Latent ambiguities fall into three main groups: (1) Unambiguous
and certain description of a person, but two persons answer the descrip-
tion equally well: Thus, in Tilley v. Ellis,'8 where the testator devised
certain property to the "Methodist Episcopal Church" and the evidence
disclosed that there were two branches thereof under similar names, the
court said this was a latent ambiguity; or where the testator leaves cer-
tain property to Mary Jones and there is more than one Mary Jones, this
is a latent ambiguity and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show the
intention of testator as to which Mary Jones was meant.' 9 (2) Unam-
biguous and certain description of property but two properties answer
the description equally well. So, when a testator devised what was
called the "Linebarger Plantation" and it could not be determined from
the will what specific piece of property was devised by this description,
the court held this to be a latent ambiguity and admitted extrinsic evi-
dence to explain it.20 (3) Unambiguous and certain description of
property or person, but the identity or location of the particular property
or person needs to be determined: Thus, where the testator was ac-
1" Ibid.
" Raines v. Osborne, supra note 13; 4 JONES, EVIDENCE § 1548 (2d ed.
1926) ; 4 PAGE, WMLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941).
"
8 Ladies Benevolent Society v. Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928);
Raines v. Osborne, 184 N. C. 603, 114 S. E. 846 (1922); McLeod v. Jones, 159
N. C. 74, 74 S. E. 733 (1912); Institute v. Norwood 45 N. C. 65 (1853); 9
WIGORRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2470-2472 (3rd ed. 1940).
' In re Will of Southerland, 188 N. C. 325, 124 S. E. 632 (1924) ; 9 WIGa0RE,
EVMIENCE § 2472 (3rd ed. 1940).
s119 N. C. 233, 26 S. E. 29 (1896); See also: Ladies Benevolent Society v.Orrell, 195 N. C. 405, 142 S. E. 493 (1928) ; Institute v. Norwood, 45 N. C. 65(1853).
" McDaniel v. King, 90 N. C. 597, 603 (1883) (dictum); 57 Amt. JUR.,
Wills § 1067 (1948).
20 Kincaid v. Lowe, 62 N.- C. 41 (1864); McDaniel v. King, supra note 19;
57 Amr. Ju., Wills § 1087 (1948).
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customed to call X by a nickname and the testator intended X to have
the property devised, even though the name used in the will was the
nickname, the court held this a latent ambiguity and extrinsic evidence
was admitted to show the intention of the testator.21
At first blush, it would seem that the Wolfe case,22 involved a latent
ambiguity, since a mere reading of the will indicates the personal prop-
erty is to go to Mrs. Wolfe, and the balance to the Red Cross. The
ambiguity becomes apparent only when it is discovered that the testator
possessed no real property and therefore, the "balance" to the Red Cross
could only be comprised of what is generally known as personal property.
Since this case does not fall into one of the three categories previously
mentioned in which a latent ambiguity must fall, the court was correct
in holding that there was no latent ambiguity. On the other hand, it
does not seem to be a true patent ambiguity since it is not apparent
on the face of the will that there is an ambiguity. However, in de-
termining that the will contained a patent ambiguity, the court evi-
dently reasoned that the phrase, "personal property," is in itself capable
of two meanings, 23 the broader including everything which is the sub-
ject of ownership except land and interest in land, while the more re-
stricted embraces only goods and chattels ;24 and thus, since it could not
be determined which was meant by the testatrix, there was a patent
ambiguity.
Although the North Carolina court's conclusions seem quite de-
fensible, the difficulty experienced by the trial court with the distinctions
between latent and patent ambiguities with the resulting questions of
admissibility of extrinsic evidence serves to emphasize the nicety of
the distinctions required.
It is the contention of the writer that our court should abandon
these old rules and follow the more practical appoach now being adopted
by many jurisdictions. This approach is to do away with the distinction
between latent and patent ambiguities. 25  Under this theory extrinsic
evidence may be admitted in cases involving patent ambiguities as in
those involving latent ambiguities to show the intent of the testator.
-1 Moseley v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S. W. 590 (1917).
2-243 N. C. 469, 91 S. E. 2d 246 (1956).
23 In holding that the phrase, "personal property," in this will is a patent am-
biguity, the court implies the phrase is ambiguous in itself. Quaere: If a testator
owns stocks, bonds, and real property and leaves the personal property to A and
the real property to B, does the will contain a patent abiguity?
"4 Blakeman v. Harwell, 198 Ga. 165, 31 S. E. 2d 50 (1944) ; Ward v. Curry,
297 Ky. 420, 180 S. W. 2d 305 (1944) ; 3 PAGE, WILLS § 964, 983 (3rd ed. 1941).
For a discussion of what passes under the words, personal property, in a will see
137 A. L. R. 212 (1942), an 162 A. L. R. 1134 (1946).25 In re Brodersen's Estate, 102 Cal. App. 2d 122, 229 P. 2d 38 (1951) ; Sater
v. Sater, 329 Mich. 706, 46 N. W. 2d 433 (1951) ; Moore v. Parrish, 38 Wash. 2d
642, 228 P. 2d 142 (1951); Fay v. Strader, 234 Minn. 444, 48 N. W. 2d 657
(1951) ; 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941) ; 57 Am. JUR., Wills § 1043 (1948).
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The court would only determine if there was an ambiguity; if so, ex-
trinsic evidence could be introduced allowing the jury to clear it up.
Such a rule would seem to permit greater freedom in determining the
testator's intent. In Armistead v. Armistead,26 the court stated: "The
distinction between latent and patent ambiguities, when examined, is
wholly unphilosophical, and founded upon a scholastic quibble of Lord
Bacon."
Another court has said: "The distinction between 'latent' and
'patent' ambiguities is now practically ignored and disregarded. The
courts without regard to the distinction, endeavor to arrive by the most
direct way at what the testator meant when he wrote the will."27
One of the chief arguments against changing to the new rule is that
it would encourage interested persons to perjure themselves.28  This
type of reasoning seems to rest on the assumption that more people will
be untruthful than will be truthful. While admitting that in a very few
cases a witness might perjure himself, it would seem that in the far
greater number of cases justice would be done by finding out the in-
tention of the testator so that the property could be disposed of as he
wished. The North Carolina Court has approached this position by
admitting the "circumstances attendant" in the case of a patent am-
biguity. It is submitted that the court should abandon altogether the
distinction between "latent" and "patent" ambiguities and, in all cases
where there is an ambiguity, admit the evidence necessary to establish
the intent of the testator.
EDWIN T. PULLEN
232 Ga. 597 (1861).
" Haupt v. Michaelis, Tex. Com. App., 231 S. W. 706 (1921).284 PAGE, WLLS § 1623 (3rd ed. 1941).
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